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In highly multicultural societies, the economic status hierarchy may come to mimic the
hierarchy of global wealth, reinforcing social inequality by tying pay scales to national
wealth. We investigated how nationality influences expectations of payment in the UAE.
Participants reported how much they expected people to be paid and how much skill
they were perceived to have by nationality. They also reported their perceptions of the
national wealth of different countries. Participants generally expected Westerners to be
paid more than Arabs, who would be paid more than Sub-Saharan Africans and Asians.
Expectations about payment in private sector employment were driven by both actual
and stereotyped differences in national wealth and skill, with non-Gulf Cooperation
Council Arabs most likely to see national wealth as a factor explaining the economic
hierarchy. These results suggest that people expect payment to be tied to national
wealth, reflecting the global hierarchy on a microscale.
Keywords: status, inequality, system justification, national wealth, stereotypes
Introduction
Disparities in national wealth are striking. Qatar, for example, produces a gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita of $102,100 while the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a GDP per capita
of only $400 (The World Factbook, 2015). Such disparities have been tied to explanations ranging
from diﬀerences in national intelligence (i.e., blaming the poor; Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006) to a
history of colonization and neoliberal economic policies (i.e., blaming the rich; Hickel, 2013). The
current work looks at how the simple existence of national wealth disparities, regardless of their
cause, may help maintain global inequality in a single context.
Research on system justiﬁcation theory (see Jost and Banaji, 1994) argues that justifying and
explaining status diﬀerences helps maintain stability within a system by promoting norms favoring
dominant groups. This paper investigates how existing global inequality may be used to understand
and explain status diﬀerences in a highly diverse society, focusing on how both perceptions of
and actual diﬀerences in national wealth may be used to understand a nationality-based economic
status hierarchy at a local level.We also investigate how perceived and actual merit, which has more
commonly been examined as an ideological explanation for the position of disadvantaged group
members (see Jost and Hunyady, 2005), inﬂuence individuals’ expectations of salary diﬀerences.
System Justiﬁcation Theory argues that people are motivated to perceive the norms, rules, and
structures within their societies as legitimate, even when those structures disadvantage them as
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individuals. In fact, Jost et al. (2003) argue that the motive to
justify unequal status in society should be particularly strong
for members of disadvantaged groups, who experience the most
ideological dissonance in trying to understand their low status in
society.
A number of other factors inﬂuence the system justiﬁcation
motive as well. Kay and Friesen (2011) argue that people are
motivated to defend the social order when they are dependent on
the system, when they perceive a lack of personal control, when
the system is under threat, or when the system is inescapable (see
also Laurin et al., 2010). Likewise, system longevity (Blanchar and
Eidelman, 2013), a sense of powerlessness (van der Toorn et al.,
2015), or individual diﬀerences in need for order, structure, and
closure, openness to experience, and perceptions of the world as
a dangerous place (Jost and Hunyady, 2005) increase defense of
the status quo.
Defense of the status quo takes several shapes, one of which
is the creation and maintenance of stereotypes that explain the
relative status of groups within society. Jost et al. (2005), for
example, showed across three national samples that high-status
groups tended to be stereotyped as agentic, whereas low status
groups were perceived as communal. These stereotypes were
observed among both high- and low-status group members and
could be used to legitimize an existing social order by supporting
the idea that groups with skill achieve (and therefore deserve)
higher status in society.
A growing body of research has shown evidence of system
justiﬁcation in regions outside of Western, capitalistic societies,
where the system is expected to reward such eﬀort and ability.
For example, Henry and Saul (2006) showed that low-status
school children in Bolivia believed that the government was
eﬀectively meeting people’s needs even more than their high
status counterparts, providing evidence of system justiﬁcation
in a developing country. van der Toorn et al. (2010) found
evidence of system justiﬁcation in the U.S. and Hungary,
but showed that whereas endorsement of system-justifying
ideologies was associated with more favorable views of work
scenarios that emphasized equity (merit-based payment) in the
U.S., endorsement of system-justifying ideologies in Hungary
was associated with more favorable views of scenarios that
emphasized equality and the favoring of a coworker over the
self (a communist value). In a review of system justiﬁcation
in capitalist and post-Communist societies, Cichocka and
Jost (2014) argued that although there is a weaker degree
of system justiﬁcation in post-Communist societies overall,
system justiﬁcation has similar antecedents, manifestations, and
consequences across all sampled societies. Taken together, these
studies suggest that system justiﬁcation is a global phenomenon,
although the extent to which it is endorsed and the speciﬁc status-
oriented scenarios that are favored may vary with local systems
and norms.
The current work investigates how status diﬀerences are
understood in the UAE, amodern emerging economy comprising
a globally diverse workforce. The system in the UAE is stable
with laws that reduce the possibility and probability of collective
mobility (see Issa, 2006). According to previous research, this lack
of personal control is likely to motivate strong support for the
status quo, or at least demand explanations for social hierarchy
(i.e., Laurin et al., 2010; Kay and Friesen, 2011), especially from
individuals who occupy low status positions (Jost et al., 2003).
The economic system in the UAE is highly stratiﬁed. Salary
surveys show that, among individuals in the private sector
working at the same job, Western expatriates tend to make more
than Arab expatriates, who tend to make more than South Asian
expatriates (Al-Awad and Elhiraika, 2003; Nagraj, 2013; Pant,
2013), although the gap between Western and Arab expatriates
has recently decreased (Anderson, 2014). Such salary diﬀerences
are part of the national dialog (Salama, 2004; Al Subaihi, 2012),
and are well known to residents and research participants, many
of whom seem to expect merit to play a role alongside nationality
in salary decisions (see Maitner, 2015).
There are several possible ways that individuals may
understand the nationality-based hierarchy. First, because there
are national diﬀerences in education, it may be that some
nationalities are actually better qualiﬁed and prepared for work
than others, and are consequently paid more for their superior
skills. An alternative possibility is that, like in Western countries,
higher status groups may be perceived as more qualiﬁed than
lower status groups, independent of any true diﬀerences in
competence. If this is the case, then stereotypes of national level
qualiﬁcations may inﬂuence how much individuals of diﬀerent
nationalities earn.
Alternatively, the economic status hierarchy may be unrelated
to national diﬀerences in either perceived or actual qualiﬁcations,
and may instead simply reﬂect the global economic hierarchy,
either in actuality, or in how it is perceived. Arab culture tends
to be hierarchical such that people who have more wasta, or
social inﬂuence based on individual connections, are expected to
achieve better outcomes than those with less social inﬂuence (see
Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1994). In other words, in the local
system, individuals expect ascribed status to strongly inﬂuence
people’s outcomes. Following van der Toorn et al. (2010), we
may therefore expect such local values to play a role in the
way individuals justify or explain the current system. If this is
the case, it may be that ascribed status associated with one’s
nationality will be perceived as an especially potent explanation
for socioeconomic status within the UAE. Additionally, given that
89% of residents (in 2010) are foreigners (United Arab Emirates
National Bureau of Statistics, 2011), ascribed status associated
with the economic power of one’s nationality may serve as a
simple and direct explanation for salary discrepancies. In this
case, actual or perceived diﬀerences in national wealth should
play a role in how much individuals expect people from diﬀerent
nationalities to earn.
According to Gulf Business, “Local companies are still willing
to pay a premium for Western expatriates from outside the
region, due to the perception that they possess a particular
skill set not locally available and that they have to be paid
comparable rates for the same position in their home country. . ..”
(Nagraj, 2013). In other words, business experts assert that
stereotypes of both skill diﬀerences and national economies play
a role in explaining salary hierarchies. Such stereotypes may help
institutionalize and perpetuate a system of global inequality on a
microscale.
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Wakslak et al. (2011) have argued that once a system
justiﬁcation motive has been activated via system threat,
individuals may aim to justify the system at diﬀerent levels, from
microscale systems such as families and friendship cliques to
larger-scale systems such as national economies. Their results
suggest that individuals may defend multiple social systems
even when only one system has been threatened, an eﬀect they
call spreading rationalization. Here we investigate whether the
hierarchy of a superordinate system may be used to explain the
hierarchy in a subordinate system that individuals are motivated
to defend. In this way, both systems may be legitimized and
inequality perpetuated.
This study investigates the contribution of actual nation
characteristics (i.e., GDP per capita and mean education levels –
reﬂecting the actual global hierarchy) and national stereotypes
(i.e., perceived wealth and skill – reﬂecting the stereotyped
global hierarchy) on expected salaries for employees with
diﬀerent nationalities. Therefore it is also pitting markers of
ascribed status, either real or perceived (GDP per capita and
perceived wealth), against markers of earned status (mean
education levels and perceived skill) to investigate how the two
kinds of explanations are used to understand socioeconomic
hierarchy in a non-Western economy. Using a diverse sample
of UAE-based students, we ﬁrst examine whether stereotypes
about the agency (merit) and success (wealth) of diﬀerent
groups reﬂect the relative status they hold in UAE society,
expecting nationalities perceived as higher on the economic
status hierarchy (nationalities expected to be paid higher salaries)
to be perceived as more agentic and successful (see Jost et al.,
2005). Second we investigate the role that structural variables
and stereotypes play in explaining the perceived economic
hierarchy, expecting stereotypes about national merit and wealth
to be used as explanations for perceived nationality-based
payment diﬀerences. Third, we investigate whether the extent
to which individuals use wealth or skill-based explanations for
economic diﬀerences varies by participant nationality, expecting
participants lower in the economic hierarchy to show stronger
motives to explain status diﬀerences (see Jost et al., 2003). Finally,
we examine whether the extent to which individuals use wealth
or skill-based explanations for economic diﬀerences varies by
target nationality; here we explore whether people use diﬀerent
explanations for salaries of groups who hold diﬀerent positions
in society or whether the same explanations are used across all
groups, regardless of their relative status.
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred ninety-ﬁve students (M age = 19.98, SD = 1.60;
78 male, 116 female, 1 unreported; 1 American, 2 Bangladeshi,
2 British, 2 Canadian, 1 Chinese, 19 Egyptian, 39 Emirati,
1 Filipino, 1 German, 1 Hungarian, 22 Indian, 3 Iranian, 3
Iraqi, 13 Jordanian, 1 Kuwaiti, 5 Lebanese, 1 Mozambican, 5
Nigerian, 16 Pakistani, 11 Palestinian, 7 Saudi, 1 Somali, 1
Sri Lankan, 5 Sudanese, 10 Syrian, 1 Tajik, 1 Tanzanian, 1
Turkish, 1 Ukrainian, 8 multiple nationalities, 10 unreported)
from the American University of Sharjah completed the survey
for partial course credit. Although the restricted sample is not
representative of the country as a whole, university students
represent a group who will soon enter the workforce with
strong educational credentials. This sample therefore represents
a nationally diverse, skilled group for whom the issue of
salary is personally relevant. Moreover, because they have not
yet entered the workforce, participants’ perceptions are likely
to be reﬂective of local expectations rather than personal
experience, allowing us to investigate the perceptions they report
as stereotypes.
Procedure
The following procedure was approved by the Institutional
Review Board at the American University of Sharjah.
Participants were told that the study investigated the impact
of nationality on pay and ability. All participants began by
reading and signing informed consent documentation. They then
received all instructions and completed the study on computers
running MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2012). They were asked
to provide their ﬁrst responses to the questions that followed,
reporting expected salary and perceptions of qualiﬁcations and
national wealth for 29 diﬀerent nationalities which are visibly
present in the UAE.
These 29 independent nationalities were categorized based
on region for analysis purposes. Categories were created in
an attempt to identify regional groups that play meaningfully
diﬀerent roles in UAE society and that reside in diﬀerent positions
in the economic hierarchy. Because salary surveys frequently
report salary for Western, South Asian, and Arab expatriates,
we began with these three groups. However, because member
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE,
have stronger national economies associated with higher levels
of ascribed status, we diﬀerentiated GCC Arab and non-GCC
Arab target groups. Finally, in an attempt to explore perceptions
of additional regions, we included Sub-Saharan African and
Southeast Asian countries. Target regions included:
(1) Western: American, Australian, British, and French
(2) South Asian: Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan
(3) Non-GCC Arab: Egyptian, Moroccan, Sudanese, Tunisian,
Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni
(4) GCC Arab: Emirati, Kuwaiti, Omani, Qatari, and Saudi
(5) Sub-Saharan African: Ethiopian, Kenyan, Nigerian, and
Somali
(6) Southeast Asian: Filipino, Indonesian, and Malaysian
We attempted to use the same breakdown in creating
categories of participants’ nationalities, but only had suﬃcient
representation for the South Asian, non-GCC Arab, and GCC
Arab regions. All other nationalities were collapsed into a single
“Other” region (see Table 1).
Expected Salary
Participants began by reporting expected starting salaries by
nationality. They were asked to “please imagine that the person
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for study variables.
Level of
aggregation
Variable Mean (SD) or N (%)
Rating Expected Pay 2.79 (1.24)
Perceptions of national wealth 2.68 (1.28)
Perceptions of national skill 2.90 (1.15)
Person Region for participant’s nationality
South Asian 43 (22.1%)
Non-GCC Arab 73 (37.4%)
GCC Arab 48 (24.6%)
Other 31 (15.9%)
Nation Actual GDP per capita $14,589 ($15,898)
Actual amount of schooling 12.48 (3.49)
Region for rated nation
Western 4 (14.3%)
South Asian 4 (14.3%)
Non-GCC Arab 9 (32.1%)
GCC Arab 4 (14.3%)
Sub-Saharan African 4 (14.3%)
Southeast Asian 3 (10.7%)
described was qualiﬁed for a job that had a starting salary
range. We will ask you to estimate, given the possible range,
how much the person would be likely to be paid.” Participants
then responded to the prompt “In the private sector, if a(n)
[nationality] was hired for a job for which (s)he was qualiﬁed,
(s)he would likely be oﬀered a starting salary which was at the
_____ of the salary range” using a scale anchored at 1= lowest end
and 5= highest end. Participants evaluated the 29 nationalities in
a random order.
Expected Qualifications
After rating salary expectations for all nationalities, participants
were told “for the next several questions, please think about how
most people perceive the skill level (a combination of education,
ability, and work ethic) of diﬀerent national groups. We will
ask you to estimate, given the possible range, how much skill a
person with a particular nationality is expected to have.” They
then evaluated the 29 nationalities in a random order, on the
item: “A(n) [nationality] is expected to have skills (a combination
of education, ability, and work ethic) at the __________ of a
scale compared to other nationalities,” using a scale anchored at
1= lowest end and 5= highest end.
Expected National Wealth
Finally, participants were asked to rate the national wealth
of the 29 countries compared to other countries. Here they
responded to the item “The national wealth of [country] is at the
___________ compared to other countries,” again using a scale
anchored at 1 = lowest end and 5 = highest end. Participants
then reported personal demographic information before being
thanked and debriefed.
National Statistics
After data were collected from participants, we retrieved the
most recent available data on GDP per capita (the total value
of goods and services produced by a nation valued at prices
prevailing in the U.S., then divided by the total population –taken
as an indicator of national wealth) and school life expectancy
(average number of years of schooling – taken as an indicator
of national qualiﬁcations) from the World Factbook, a data
repository maintained by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
that provides a diverse collection of information on 267 world
entities.
Results
Outliers
Before performing our main analyses, we graphically examined
the distributions of our main variables to identify potential
outliers. In our investigation of the nations being rated, we noted
that that GDP per capita for Qatar ($102,100) was almost twice as
large as the second highest GDP per capita ($52,800) and 3.75 SD
greater than the mean GDP per capita ($17,606). We therefore
decided to remove the ratings of Qatar from our analyses so that
they would not bias results. We did not have any participants
from Qatar, so we did not need to investigate the possibility of
Qatari participants being outliers on any ratings.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in our analyses
appear in Table 1.
The data for the present study was collected at three diﬀerent
levels. The 195 participants evaluated the pay, wealth and skill
of the 28 target nationalities (excluding Qatari) for a total of
5460 ratings. Each of the 195 participants also reported their own
nationality, which was then used to determine participant region.
Finally, information about the GDP per capita and average
amount of schooling were retrieved for the 28 target nationalities.
The descriptive statistics for each of our variables was calculated
based on the level at which the data were collected. Therefore, the
statistics for rated pay, wealth, and skill were calculated based on
the 5460 ratings, the counts for participant region were calculated
based on the 195 reports from participants, and the statistics for
actual GDP and amount of schooling were calculated based on
the 28 reports from the rated nations.
Given that our variables were collected at diﬀerent levels
of aggregation, we decided to examine the bivariate relations
among variables at multiple levels of aggregation. Table 2
presents the correlations among the perceived and actual nation
characteristics.
Since national stereotypes were assessed at the rating level and
the actual nation characteristics were assessed at the nation level,
we present the correlations at both of these levels of aggregation.
All of the correlations are positive, strong, and signiﬁcant. The
correlations at the nation level are expectedly higher because
the nation-level aggregates of perceived characteristics average
over person-level variability (which is included in the individual
ratings). As can be seen, perceptions of wealth and actual wealth
were highly related, as were perceptions of skill and amount of
schooling, indicating that participants’ stereotypes were largely,
but not wholly, accurate.
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TABLE 2 | Correlations among rated and actual nation characteristics by
level of aggregation.
1 2 3 4 5
Rating level
1. Perceptions of pay −
2. Perceptions of wealth 0.67 −
3. Perceptions of skill 0.47 0.46 −
4. GDP per capita 0.64 0.71 0.39 −
5. Average amount of schooling 0.52 0.58 0.35 0.78 −
Nation level
1. Perceptions of pay −
2. Perceptions of wealth 0.95 −
3. Perceptions of skill 0.83 0.77 −
4. GDP per capita 0.90 0.93 0.78 −
5. Average amount of schooling 0.74 0.78 0.69 0.78 −
All correlations are significant (p < 0.005).
Participant nationality was assessed at the person level, so we
used a data set aggregated to the person level to test the bivariate
relations of the participant’s region with expected pay, perceived
wealth, and perceived skill. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA
indicated that participant region was signiﬁcantly related to
perceived wealth [F(3,191) = 3.65, p = 0.01], such that those
from GCC nations provided signiﬁcantly lower ratings of
wealth (M = 2.54, SD = 0.45) than those from other nations
(M = 2.73, pooled SD = 0.37). One-way between-subjects
ANOVAs indicated that participant region was not signiﬁcantly
related to either expected pay [F(3,191) = 1.73, p = 0.16] or
perceived skill [F(3,190) = 0.50, p = 0.68]. This suggests that at
an overall level, there is remarkable consistency across the diverse
participant pool in ratings of national wealth, pay, and skill, with
the exception of GCC Arabs rating national wealth lower across
national groups. Overall, diﬀerent groups living in the UAE share
stereotypes about diﬀerent nationalities.
Stereotypes and the National Hierarchy
To test our ﬁrst research question asking whether stereotypes
about the merit and wealth of diﬀerent groups reﬂect the relative
status they hold, we examined the bivariate relations of region
being rated with perceived nation characteristics. To secondarily
assess how closely those stereotypes reﬂect global reality, we
also assessed the bivariate relations of region being rated with
actual nation characteristics. Region of the nation being rated was
assessed at the nation level, so we used a data set aggregated to
the nation level to investigate these relations. The means of and
homogenous subsets for these variables by region are provided in
Table 3.
A collection of one-sample between-subjects ANOVAs
indicate that the rated region had signiﬁcant eﬀects on all of these
variables (all p’s < 0.005). Typically, Western nations had the
highest ratings, followed by GCC Arab nations, followed by the
other nations. The eﬀects were strongest for expected pay and
GDP per capita (R2s> 0.90) and weakest for the average amount
of schooling (R2 = 0.57).
As can be seen in Table 3, participants expected individuals
from Western nations to be paid more than individuals from
TABLE 3 | Means and homogenous subsets of perceived and actual nation
characteristic by rated region.
Rated
region
Expected
pay
Perceived
wealth
Perceived
skill
GDP per
capita
Average
schooling
Western 4.23D 4.22C 4.13D $42,200C 17.25C
South Asian 1.91A 1.93AB 2.59AB $3,925A 11.00AB
Non-GCC
Arab
2.69B 2.30B 2.87BC $6,333A 11.25A
GCC Arab 3.82C 3.98C 2.90C $33,275B 15.00BC
Sub-Saharan
African
1.96A 1.76A 2.30A $1,625A 9.00A
Southeast
Asian
2.06A 2.29AB 2.63AB $9,133A 12.33AB
Means within a column that share a subscript are not significantly different from
each other (LSD p > 0.05).
GCC Arab nations, followed by non-GCC Arab nationals.
Participants expected individuals from South Asian, Sub-Saharan
African, and Southeast Asian nations to earn the least for
the same job. These ﬁndings denote the perceived economic
hierarchy in the UAE, and show that participants have a
fair idea of how much individuals with diﬀerent nationalities
are actually paid in a relative sense (see Nagraj, 2013; Pant,
2013).
Participants also perceived nationals fromWestern states to be
more skilled than nationals from GCC Arab states, followed by
nationals from non-GCC Arab states, then South and Southeast
Asian states, and ﬁnally Sub-Saharan African states. In other
words, stereotypes about the agency of diﬀerent segments of
society roughly mirror the expected payment those members
of society are expected to receive. This ﬁnding reﬂects that of
previous research (Jost et al., 2005) with individuals from nations
expected to be higher in the economic hierarchy also expected to
possess more skill.
Stereotypes about national wealth also roughly mirror the
expected payment hierarchy. Themore payment individuals from
a region are expected to receive, the more wealth that region
is expected to have. Although actual national wealth (GDP per
capita) also mirrors somewhat the hierarchy seen in expectations
of payment by region, it fails to diﬀerentiate between non-GCC
Arab, South and South East Asian, and Sub-Saharan African
countries. This suggests that the perceived status hierarchy in the
UAE (the hierarchy reﬂecting expected pay) is more nuanced and
diﬀerentiated than global economic reality.
Bivariate correlations reported in Table 2 provide further
support for the idea that stereotypes about themerit and wealth of
diﬀerent groups reﬂect the relative status they hold, showing that
perceptions of payment are highly associated with perceptions of
and actual diﬀerences in national wealth and skill.
Predicting Expected Pay from Stereotypes and
National Characteristics
To examine our second research question investigating how both
stereotypes of and actual estimates of national wealth and skill
relate to expected pay, we ran a linear mixed model in SPSS
(version 21) predicting expected pay from stereotypes of national
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wealth, stereotypes of national skill, actual national GDP per
capita, and actual national years of schooling on data at the
rating level while adjusting for participant as a cluster variable.
The continuous predictor variables were all group-mean centered
(although this is the same as grand mean centering for actual
GDP per capita and average years of schooling since these values
did not vary between participants). After centering, the predictors
were all divided by their standard deviation so that coeﬃcients
from the model represent expected change in the outcome with
a 1 standard deviation change in the corresponding predictor.
The model allowed for random intercepts and random slopes
for the ratings of national wealth and national skill because the
meaning of these two variables could vary between participants.
All of these random eﬀects were signiﬁcant (all p’s < 0.05),
indicating that the mean ratings of expected pay and the relations
of ratings of wealth and skill with the rating of expected pay varied
signiﬁcantly across participants.
We also included the region of the nation being rated and the
region of the participant’s nationality in the model as categorical
blocking factors. In analyses, the rated region was represented
by a set of dummy codes with “Southeast Asian” being the
reference group. The participant’s region was represented by a set
of dummy codes with “Other” as the reference group.
Omnibus tests indicated that the overall test for rated region
was signiﬁcant [F(5,4055) = 120.54, p < 0.001], but the overall
test for participant’s region was not signiﬁcant [F(5,170) = 1.20,
p = 0.31]. Means and homogeneous subsets for rated region are
presented in Table 4.
These means diﬀer somewhat from those presented in Table 3
because they control for the eﬀects of perceived and actual nation
characteristics, as well as the eﬀect of participant region. As
expected, and reﬂecting the bivariate analyses reported above, the
highest pay was expected for individuals from Western nations,
whereas the lowest pay was expected for individuals from South
Asian and Southeast Asian nations.
The coeﬃcients for the ﬁxed eﬀects in this model are presented
in Table 5.
These results indicate that expected pay was higher when the
participant perceived the nation as being wealthier or having
individuals with more skill, and when the nation actually had a
higher GDP per capita or higher average amount of schooling. In
other words, in line with assessments of business professionals,
participants seem to expect salary to follow from both national
TABLE 4 | Means and homogenous subsets for the main effect of rated
region.
Rated region Mean expected pay
Western 3.360E
South Asian 2.295A
Non-GCC Arab 2.864C
GCC Arab 3.059D
Sub-Saharan African 2.481B
Southeast Asian 2.289A
Means not sharing the same subscripts are significantly different from each other
(p < 0.05).
TABLE 5 | Coefficients from model testing main effects on expected pay.
Predictor Estimate (SE) p-value
Intercept 2.249 (0.094) <0.001
Perceived national wealth 0.308 (0.026) <0.001
Perceived national skill 0.189 (0.020) <0.001
GDP per capita 0.220 (0.049) <0.001
Average amount of schooling 0.040 (0.015) 0.008
Rated region
Western dummy 1.071 (0.077) <0.001
South Asian dummy 0.006 (0.037) 0.88
Non-GCC Arab dummy 0.575 (0.032) <0.001
Sub-Saharan African dummy 0.192 (0.041) <0.001
GCC Arab dummy 0.771 (0.065) <0.001
Participant’s region
South Asian dummy 0.218 (0.117) 0.06
Non-GCC Arab dummy 0.055 (0.106) 0.61
GCC Arab dummy 0.031 (0.114) 0.79
Continuous predictors are centered and on a standardized metric, so the
coefficients represent the expected change in expected pay with a 1 SD increase
in the predictor.
wealth and qualiﬁcations, with stereotypes and actual diﬀerences
in those variables playing independent roles in inﬂuencing
participant expectations.
Moderating Effects of Participant’s Region
To test our third research question, we investigated whether the
geographic region a participant was from inﬂuenced observed
relations between national stereotypes and expected pay. We
expected participants from regions lower on the economic
status hierarchy (non-GCC Arabs and South Asians) to show a
stronger need to explain the hierarchy, and therefore to show
stronger relations between stereotypes and expected pay. To test
this hypothesis, we ran a linear mixed model that predicted
expected pay from the main eﬀects discussed above plus the
interactions of the participant’s region with perceived wealth
and perceived skill. We decided not to examine the interactions
of participant’s region with the actual nation characteristics
(GDP per capita and average amount of schooling) because
these interactions are strongly aﬀected by which nations were
included in the study and how those nations were divided into
regions, which were researcher choices. The model adjusted
for participant as a cluster variable. Centering was used in
the same way as in the prior model. The model allowed
for random intercepts and random slopes for the ratings
of national wealth and national skill. All of these random
eﬀects were signiﬁcant (all p’s < 0.05). Interaction terms were
tested by including a set of product terms, multiplying each
of the region dummy codes by the corresponding predictor
variable.
The coeﬃcients for the ﬁxed eﬀects in this model are presented
in Table 6.
The omnibus test for the interaction between the participant’s
region and rated wealth was signiﬁcant [F(3,201) = 7.80,
p < 0.001], but the omnibus test for the interaction between
the participant’s region and rated skill was not [F[3,194) = 0.30,
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TABLE 6 | Interaction coefficients from model testing the moderating
effects of the participant’s region.
Predictor Estimate (SE) p-value
Participant’s region × perceived wealth
South Asian dummy × perceived wealth −0.036 (0.076) 0.64
Non-GCC Arab dummy × perceived wealth 0.129 (0.069) 0.06
GCC Arab dummy × perceived wealth −0.150 (0.074) 0.04
Participant’s region × perceived skill
South Asian dummy × perceived skill 0.011 (0.066) 0.87
Non-GCC Arab dummy × perceived skill 0.045 (0.060) 0.45
GCC Arab dummy × perceived skill 0.044 (0.065) 0.50
p = 0.85]. The slopes and homogeneous subsets for rated wealth
and rated skill by participant region are presented in Table 7.
As can be seen, the ratings of wealth are least predictive for
those from GCC Arab nations and most predictive for those
from non-GCC Arab nations. In other words, GCC Arabs expect
national wealth to make a smaller diﬀerence in how much
individuals are paid, whereas non-GCC Arabs expect national
wealth to make a larger diﬀerence in how much individuals are
paid.
These results suggest that non-GCC Arabs, who are relatively
disadvantaged in the local hierarchy, expect national wealth
to play a more important role in determining how much
individuals are paid than other participants. This may reﬂect
a stronger motive to justify or explain the hierarchy in
relatively disadvantaged participants. Importantly, the method
they employed seems to reﬂect local values of hierarchy reﬂecting
ascribed status (i.e., payment follows from national wealth), in
contrast to Western values of hierarchy reﬂecting earned status
(i.e., payment follows from national skill).
Indeed, neither non-GCC Arabs nor South Asians were more
likely than other participants (GCC Arabs and ‘other’) to use
stereotypes about skills to understand the payment hierarchy,
suggesting that merit, while an important contributor to
participants’ payment expectations overall, may not help reduce
dissonance as strongly as considerations of wealth (i.e., ascribed
status) in UAE-based, relatively disadvantaged participants.
Moderating Effects of Region Being Rated
To test our fourth research question, we investigated whether
the geographic region of the nation being rated inﬂuenced the
relations of perceived wealth and perceived skill with expected
TABLE 7 | Slopes and homogenous subsets for perceived wealth and
perceived skill by participant’s region.
Participant’s region Expected slope for
perceived wealth
Expected slope for
perceived skill
South Asian 0.269AB 0.171A
Non-GCC Arab 0.434C 0.205A
GCC Arab 0.155A 0.204A
Other 0.305BC 0.160A
Slopes within a column that share a subscript are not significantly different from
each other (LSD p > 0.05).
pay. To examine these interactions, we ran a linear mixed model
that predicted expected pay from the main eﬀects discussed above
plus the interactions of the region being rated with perceived
wealth and perceived skill. The model adjusted for participant
as a cluster variable. Centering was used in the same way as in
the previous models. The model allowed for random intercepts
and random slopes for the ratings of national wealth and national
skill. All of these random eﬀects were signiﬁcant (all p’s < 0.05).
Interaction terms were tested by including a set of product
terms, multiplying each of the region dummy codes by the
corresponding predictor variable. The interaction terms were all
tested simultaneously.
The coeﬃcients for the ﬁxed eﬀects in this model are presented
in Table 8.
The omnibus test for the interaction between region rated
and rated wealth [F(5,4543) = 2.51, p = 0.03] and the omnibus
test for the interaction between region rated and rated skill
[F(5,4577) = 3.38, p = 0.005) were signiﬁcant. The slopes
and homogeneous subsets for rated wealth and rated skill by
participant region are presented in Table 9.
From this, we can see that perceived wealth has the largest
impact on expected pay when the rated nation is from the GCC
region, and that this relation is signiﬁcantly stronger than that
found for any of the other regions except that for Sub-Saharan
African nations. In other words, participants expected GCC
TABLE 8 | Interaction coefficients from model testing the moderating
effects of the rated region.
Predictor Estimate (SE) p-value
Rated region × perceived wealth
Western dummy × perceived wealth 0.017 (0.062) 0.78
South Asian dummy × perceived wealth −0.007 (0.060) 0.91
Non-GCC Arab dummy × perceived wealth 0.031 (0.053) 0.56
Sub-Saharan African dummy × perceived wealth 0.068 (0.069) 0.32
GCC Arab dummy × perceived wealth 0.154 (0.057) 0.006
Rated region × perceived skill
Western dummy × perceived skill −0.001 (0.051) 0.98
South Asian dummy × perceived skill −0.033 (0.048) 0.50
Non-GCC Arab dummy × perceived skill 0.017 (0.045) 0.70
Sub-Saharan African dummy × perceived skill 0.016 (0.056) 0.78
GCC Arab dummy × perceived skill −0.159 (0.054) 0.003
TABLE 9 | Slopes and homogenous subsets for perceived wealth and
perceived skill by rated region.
Rated region Expected slope for
perceived wealth
Expected slope for
perceived skill
Western 0.276A 0.214B
South Asian 0.252A 0.183B
Non-GCC Arab 0.290A 0.233B
GCC Arab 0.414B 0.056A
Sub-Saharan African 0.326AB 0.231B
Southeast Asian 0.259A 0.216B
Slopes within a column that share a subscript are not significantly different from
each other (LSD p > 0.05).
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Arabs’ salaries to be inﬂuenced by their countries’ wealth more
than they expected other individuals’ salaries to be inﬂuenced by
the wealth of their nation of origin. We can also see that rated skill
is not perceived as important when assigning pay to individuals
from GCC Arab nations, but is positively related to the rated
pay for other regions. In other words, participants did not expect
GCC Arabs’ salaries to be inﬂuenced by their countries’ expected
skill, although this was an important factor for individuals from
other nations.
In sum, it seems that the predicted pay for individuals from
GCC Arab nations is more strongly inﬂuenced by perceptions
of national wealth and less strongly inﬂuenced by perceptions of
national skill relative to other regions.
Discussion
Results indicated that participants representing diﬀerent
nationalities share a perception of a local economic hierarchy,
with Westerners expected to earn more than Arabs, who are
expected to earn more than Sub-Saharan Africans and Asians.
Moreover, that hierarchy is reﬂected in stereotypes about
national skill and wealth, with nationalities that are expected to
be more economically powerful in the local context perceived
as more skillful and wealthy. Results further indicated that
these stereotypes support diﬀerences in expected payment, as
both stereotypes about and real diﬀerences in national wealth
and skill were predictive of salaries for people of diﬀerent
nationalities. A stronger relationship between perceived wealth
and payment was found for non-GCC Arabs, who occupy a
relatively disadvantaged position in the local hierarchy, though
South Asians, those lowest in the local hierarchy, did not seem to
rely on either stereotypes about skill or wealth more than other
groups to understand payment diﬀerences in society. Finally, the
results indicated that participants considered national wealth
to be a more important contributor and national skill a less
important contributor to salaries for GCC Arabs relative to other
regional groups.
Our ﬁndings suggest that, national stereotypes, including
perceptions of wealth and skill, support the status hierarchy,
with Western countries perceived as more skilled and wealthy
than other regions. These stereotypes appear to have a basis
in international reality, with Western nations typically having
higher GDPs and amounts of schooling than other regional
groups. However, actual GDP and schooling fail to fully explain
diﬀerences in expected payment, and therefore it is likely
that stereotypic perceptions help create and explain a more
nuanced local hierarchy, with regions expected to fall lower in
the hierarchy perceived as less skilled and wealthy than other
regions. Like Jost et al. (2005), then, we show the importance of
stereotypes in explaining status diﬀerences in society. However,
we show that in this context, where local norms tie hierarchy to
preexisting indicators of inﬂuence, explanations tied to ascribed
status may be embraced at least as strongly as explanations tied to
earned status.
Both actual nation characteristics, including GDP and school
life expectancy, and perceptions of national characteristics,
including national wealth and skill, independently predicted how
much participants expected individuals to be paid. This suggests
that participants may be using explanations based in global
economic diﬀerences to understand the local hierarchy, using the
global hierarchy to explain the local one. In this way, individuals
may show a diﬀerent form of spreading rationalization, using
knowledge about the macrosystem to explain (and perhaps
defend) the microsystem. However, it seems that the local
hierarchy is understood as reﬂective of both privilege and merit,
with participants expecting both ascribed status (associated with
a nation’s wealth) and earned status (associated with a nation’s
skill) to inﬂuence salary.
We found that non-GCC Arabs expected national wealth
to play a stronger role in determining an individual’s salary
than individuals from GCC Arab states or South Asia. Similar
to Jost et al. (2003), it appears that individuals lower in the
socio-economic hierarchy are more likely to use indicators, in
this case national wealth, to understand or predict economic
outcomes, reﬂecting a stronger ideological need to explain
the economic hierarchy. Unexpectedly, South Asians, the most
disadvantaged group represented in our sample, did not show a
similar propensity, and in fact, did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
GCC Arabs, the most privileged group within our sample. It
may be that individuals holding a local ethnicity have a stronger
motivation to explain their position than individuals who do not
share as many characteristics with the local population. However,
this intriguing diﬀerence demands further investigation.
Although perceptions of national wealth predicted salary
for individuals from all target regions, it was more predictive
of expected salary for individuals from GCC Arab states.
This ﬁnding may simply reﬂect knowledge of reality, as UAE
nationals earn as much as 44% above an industry standard
because of their nationality (Hay Group). It may also reﬂect
the importance of ascribed status in determining individuals’
outcomes, especially in the Arab world. Speciﬁcally, the ascribed
status associated with national wealth may be expected to
strongly inﬂuence outcomes for GCC Arab individuals who are
nationally economically advantaged. Because non-GCC Arab
countries do not typically have high levels of national wealth, they
may not be able to rely on such ascribed status to bolster their
position.
Consistent with that ﬁnding, we also found that perceptions
of national skill inﬂuenced expected salaries for individuals
from all regions except GCC Arabs. Taken together, this
suggests that participants expect GCC Arabs to be paid based
on national wealth, with qualiﬁcation and skill playing little
or no role in determining salary for individuals from this
region. These results add a caveat to the existing literature by
highlighting the fact that individuals may not use the same
explanations for the status position of all members of society,
and instead may rely on diﬀerent explanations for the position
of diﬀerent groups, following from either realistic or stereotypic
perceptions.
In future work, we would like to investigate more directly
whether and to what extent explanations based in national wealth
and skill are perceived as justiﬁed and legitimate explanations
for the existing social hierarchy, focusing on the extent to which
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global wealth disparities may be used to not only explain but
legitimize status diﬀerences both within and between societies.
We may also investigate whether individuals from lower
status nationalities are more satisﬁed with their position in
UAE society when they make comparisons to co-nationals
in their country of origin. Research shows that individuals
tend to compare their levels of payment to those of ingroup
rather than outgroup members and feel satisﬁed when their
payment compares favorably to that of ingroup members,
regardless of how much outgroup members are paid (see
Bylsma and Major, 1994). If individuals perceive better
opportunities in the UAE than at home, they may report
satisfaction regardless of their relative position in the UAE
status hierarchy. This could help explain why South Asians
failed to show a particularly strong reliance on wealth or
skill to understand the economic status hierarchy. Non-GCC
Arabs, sharing multiple ingroup memberships with GCC-Arabs,
may have a stronger propensity to make social comparisons
to that group (rather than ingroup members in their home
country), and may perceive unfavorable comparisons as a
result.
We may also ﬁnd that non-GCC Arab and South Asian
participants, in particular, are more satisﬁed if their salary
compares favorably to that of co-nationals in the UAE, regardless
of payment given to other nationals. Such ingroup social
comparisons also inﬂuence entitlements (Bylsma and Major,
1994), and we may further investigate whether non-GCC
Arab or South Asian participants show evidence of depressed
entitlement, attributing fewer resources to themselves, especially
when average salaries by nationality are salient (see also Jost,
1997).
Thus far, however, our work shows that actual hierarchy and
perceptions of that hierarchy are used as anchors to help make
predictions about how individuals will be treated by institutions.
The overall expectation is that wealth begets wealth: dominant
groups are favored, and disadvantage is maintained. These
ﬁndings replicate previous work in a new global context showing
that stereotypes may help explain an existing social hierarchy,
and that this may especially be the true for disadvantaged group
members (Jost et al., 2003). This work also suggests a new
way that local systems may be justiﬁed – by pointing to the
global hierarchy. In showing a connection between local and
global systems, we also demonstrate a new form of spreading
rationalization, using the hierarchy from one system to explain
(and perhaps defend) another.
Conclusion
Although some consultants suggest that the current nationality-
based economic hierarchy may disappear within the next decade
(Anderson, 2014), perceptions of the current hierarchy in the
UAE are strong and shared. Residents seem to understand this
hierarchy as reﬂective of national diﬀerences in wealth and
skill, with perceptions of national wealth providing a stronger
explanation for individuals from disadvantaged regions. To the
extent that such explanations are legitimized, these explanations
may help maintain and reinforce both local and global inequality.
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